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AND FuNCTIONs OF THE

CoNsTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS -

Before December 16, 1940, John Smith could look complacently on
the muddy creek :flowing through his pasture, secure in the knowledge
that the right to use the waters in that stream was his, free from any
outside interference, so long as he had due regard for the rights of his
neighbors. Now, however, John Smith would do well to examine the
myriad regulations and provisions of the federal statutes before damming that creek to store up water for his cows during the dry season.
It is entirely possible that his muddy creek would now be considered a
"navigable" stream in the federal courts.
On that sixteenth day of December, a majority of the United States
Supreme Court, in United States v. Appalachian Electric Power Co.,1
held that the New River-a stream which the federal district court
and circuit court of appeals had held to be nonnavigable both in fact
and in law-was navigable. In the opinion of the majority, the New
River was navigable not only because portions of it had been used in
past years as highways for transportation, but also because the entire
river might be so improved as to be usable as a highway for transportation. The New River, as a navigable stream, fell under the jurisdiction of the Federal Power Commission; and the Appalachian Electric Power Company was enjoined from proceeding further with its
water-power project on the river until it obtained a license from the
commission. If the dissenting opinion of Justice Roberts be correct in
its interpretation of the majority opinion, this new test of a stream's
navigability will include nearly. every stream in the country; for con1 (U.S. 1940) 61 S. Ci:. 291, reversing (C. C. A. 4th, 1939) 107 F. (2d) 769,
and (D. C. Va. 1938) 23 F. Supp. 83. The long history behind the litigation in the
Appalachian Power Co. case is discussed later in this comment in the section dealing
with the constitutional limitations on the Federal Power Commission. See infra, p. 990.
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ceivably any stream could be made into a waterway capable of being
used as a highway for transportation, by the expenditure of a sufficient
sum of money.
The Appalachian Power Company case suggests possibilities for the
entrance by the Federal Power Commission into a greatly enlarged
field of activity. Hence, it seems relevant at this time to re-examine the
statutory and constitutional limitations on the commission's jurisdiction
and functions. Specifically, how has the Federal Power Commission
grown? What has it done? What can it do in the way of general regulation of water-power projects and electric utilities?
I.

Federal Regulation of Waterways before

I920

Any discussion of the Federal Power Commission necessitates a
brief statement of federal regulation of water power prior to r 920.
Early legislation, following the Northwest Ordinance of r787 and the
adoption of the Constitution, was concerned with waterways as highways for transportation, and therefore dealt mostly with navigation
and river and harbor appropriations. 2 Emphasis during the greater part
of the nineteenth century continued to be on protecting and keeping
open the navigable waters of the United States.8 In r 890 Congress took
the first important step in federal control of the navigable waters subject to its jurisdiction by requiring the Secretary of War's approval of
plans for bridges and alterations in channels. 4, This act was altered in
r 899 by requiring the affirmative consent of Congress to obstructions
affecting the navigable capacity of streams as well as Congressional
approval of dams and bridges; and approval of plans and specifications
by the Secretary of War and chief of engineers was also required. 5 It
is interesting to note that at this early stage a clause was inserted in the
statute delegating most of the regulatory power over obstructions to
the state legislature when the navigable portion of a stream was wholly
within state boundaries. Federal control of power sites first appeared
in statutes relating to the use of public lands; 0 and with the General
2 Modern development of shallow watercraft and increased public interest in recreation demand continued attention to this phase of the water development program.
Starr, "Navigable Waters of the United States-State and National Control," 35
HARV. L. REv. 154 at 155 (1921). The Federal Power Commission has given recre:1tional developments consideration in many instances. Cf. FEDERAL PowER COMMISSION,
S1XTH ANNUAL REPORT I0-12 (1926).
8 Starr, "Navigable Waters of the United States-State and National Control,"
35 HARV. L. REv. 154 at 169-173 (1921).
"'26 Stat. L. 454 (1890), as amended in 27 Stat. L. IIO (1892).
5
30 Stat. L. 1151 (1899), 33 U. S. C. (1934), §§ 401, 403.
6
29 Stat. L. 120 (1896), 43 U. S. C. (1934), § 957; 33 Stat. L. 628 (1905),

16 U. S. C. (1934), § 472.
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Dam Act of 1906,1 more elaborate provisions for federal approval of
plans and specifications for dams were invoked. The era of the conservationists, symbolized by the career of "Teddy" Roosevelt, saw a
new emphasis on a public program of flood control and water conservation in general. 8 The conservationists conceived the ideas that the
government should charge for the right to use the navigable waters of
the United States for the generation of power, and that the period
during which that right could be exercised should be definitely limited. 9
Their ideas were inadequately crystallized in the Act of I 9 Io,io which
provided for charges and a fifty-year limit on rights conferred.
But capital was unwilling to venture into hydroelectric projects in
view of the risks raised by these early statutes.ii Also, it was becoming
more evident that water power was no longer a matter to be regulated
by special acts of Congress. Even the World War did not entirely
becloud the issues. In I 9 I 6 Congress began the tumultuous struggle
over the Shields Bill i 2 which culminated in the Federal Water Power
Act of I 920/ 3 In I 9 I 7 Congress set up a waterways commission to
formulate and report plans for developing water resources for naviga34 Stat. L. 3 8 6 ( 1906) • Cf. note 10, infra.
The conservationists showed foresight. Approximately 55,000,000 horsepower
is available in American rivers. Ready markets for cheap power have developed in the
electrochemical, electrophysical and electrometallurgical industries. 8 ENCYCLOPAEDIA
BRITANNICA, 14th ed., 156-158 (1937). See also among the publications of the Federal
Power Commission, PowER REQUIREMENTS IN ELECTROCHEMICAL, ELECTROMETALLURGICAL, AND ALLIED INDUSTRIES (1938). The problem of what governmental body
was to he responsible for power development was a momentous one. LeBoeuf, "State or
Federal Control of the Water Powers of Navigable Streams;' 15 GEORGETOWN L. J.
201 (1927). See also, PowELL, CONGRESSIONAL DEBATES ON THE RIGHT OF THE
FEDERAL GOVERNMENT TO OPERATE ELECTRIC POWER PROJECTS AND ON RELATED
SUBJECTS iii-v (1935) (hereinafter cited as CoNGRESSIONAL DEBATES).
9 PowELL, CoNGRESSIONALDEBATES v-vi (1935). See KERWIN, FEDERAL WATERPowER LEGISLATION 105-216 (1926), for a complete story of water-power legislation
in Congress and conventions from 1890 to 1917.
io 36 Stat. L. 593 (1910). An historical note in 33 U. S. C. A. (1928), c. 9,
p. 375, indicates that it is not clear that the Acts of 1906 and 1910, although omitted
from the United States Code, were entirely superseded by the ·Federal Water Power
Act of 1920.
n Economic and geographical obstacles contributed to this reluctance. Waterpower projects, while much cheaper to operate than steam-generating plants, require
an enormous initial investment. Also, attractive water-power sites are not always located
close to ready markets for electric energy. See KERWIN, FEDERAL WATER-POWER
LEGISLATION 13-57 (1926).
i 2 PoWELL, CoNGRESSIONAL DEBATES x, Iii (1935). See KERWIN, FEDERAL
WATER-POWER LEGISLATION 217-263 (1926), for the story of water-power legislation
from 1917 to 1920.
is 41 Stat. L. 1063 (1920), 16 U.S. C. (1934), § 791 et seq. The story of this
act is well developed by Judge Clayton in Alabama Power Co. v. Gulf Power Co.,
(D. C. Ala. 1922) 283 F. 606 at 609-610.
7
8
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tion and nearly every other conceivable purpose; 14 this act was repealed by the Federal Water Power Act of 1920,15 which is the legislative cornerstone of the present federal power program.
The Federal Water Power Act represented a logical evolution
from prior water-power legislation. It proceeded upon the theory that
Congress could prevent absolutely all obstructions to navigable waters,
and could therefore license such obstructions, making those licenses
subject to certain terms and conditions. The Act of 1920 established an
agency, the Federal Power Commission, to which Congress delegated
its authority to grant licenses, and enumerated a comprehensive schedule
of conditions on which such licenses were to be issued by the commission.18 Thus, while in its basic legal theory the act represented no
new departure, in its detailed substantive features it established the
basis for a major program of power development by the federal government.
2.

The Federal Power Commission

The decade of the twenties saw an unprecedented development of
hydroelectric power.17 With the cumbersome method of Congressional
licensing and regulating replaced by the more efficient administrative
process, and with the abstract principles of the conservationists at last
solidified, it appeared that, apart from doubts as to the constitutionality
of the Act of 1920, the water-power problem had been disposed of.
But stumbling blocks soon began to obstruct the smooth administration
of the act.
The commission at first consisted of the Secretaries of War, the
Interior, and Agriculture 18-three officers whose "terms" were relatively short and who were burdened with many other duties. The commission was confined in its staff to an executive secretary and the personnel of the members' departments.19 One writer summarized the
situation by stating that the practical effect of the Act of l 920 was to
leave the executive secretary more or less single-handed, with a borrowed office force and without the assistance of valuation engineers, to
14

40 Stat. L. 269 (1917).

15 41 Stat. L. 1077 (1920), 16 U. S. C. (1934), § 823.
16

These provisions are discussed more in detail, infra, pp. 98 5-986.
PowELL, CoNGRESSIONAL DEBATES x (1935).
18 41 Stat. L. 1063, § l (1920).
19
41 Stat. L. 1063, § 2 ( 1920). For a discussion of the early setup of divisions and
field forces as well as a complaint of insufficient personnel and consequent delay in
handling business, see FEDERAL PowER CoMMISSION, FIRST ANNUAL REPORT II, 13
( 192 l). The commission soon found difficulty in its complicated valuation work due
to an inadequate staff. FEDERAL PowER CoMMISSION, FouRTH ANNUAL REPORT
2 (1924).
17
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represent all of the interests of the people.20 In this state of affairs it
is no wonder that the work of the commission fell badly into arrears.
Consequently, following a senate investigation in 1930, a full-time independent commission with its own staff was created. 21 Since 1930 the
commission has gradually found itself and picked up its burden.22 Today
it has 790 full-time employees with offices in five principal cities in
addition to the central office in Washington. The staff is divided along
professional rather than functional lines, co-ordinated by a supervising
commissioner.2 a
In the last decade, several acts of Congress, aside from those statutes amending and adding to the Act of 1920, have conferred new
authority on the Federal Powe!" Commission. These acts are the Tennessee :Valley Authority Act, 24 the Bonneville Act,25 the Fort Peck
Act, 26 the Flood Control Act of 1938,21 and the Na~al Gas Act of
1938.28 Classified with these acts should also be Title II, Part II,29
2 ° KERWIN, FEDERAL WATER-PowER LEGISLATION 292-293 (1926). On this
problem, see Cushman, "The Problem of the Independent Regulatory Commissions,"
REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT'S CoMMITTEE ON ADMINISTRATIVE MANAGEMENT 205 at
212 (1937). Cushman suggests that the executive secretary was submitted to "terrific
pressure" by the power interests.
21 46 Stat. L. 797 (1930), 16 U.S. C. (1934), § 792.
22 Cushman, "The Problem of the Independent Regulatory Commissions," REPORT OF THE PRESIDENTS COMMITTEE ON ADMINISTRATIVE MANAGEMENT 205 at
212 (1937).
23 ATTORNEY GENERAL'S COMMITTEE ON ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE, MONOGRAPH, Part 12, "Federal Power Commission," p. 4 (1941) (Mimeographed Studies,
No. 25, pp. 8-9). FEDERAL PowER CoMMISSION, NINETEENTH ANNUAL REPORT 2
et seq. (1939), gives a summary of the commission's activities.
24 48 Stat. L. 58 (1933), 16 U. S. C. (1934), § 831 et seq., as amended
49 Stat. L. 1075 (1935), 16 U.S. C. (Supp. 1939), §§ 831 to 831dd. The Federal
Power Commission's part in most government-owned projects is to prescribe accounts
or to regulate schedules for electric rates or both. Cf. FEDERAL POWER CoMMISSION,
EIGHTEENTH ANNUAL REPORT 9 (1938).
25 50 Stat. L. 731 (1937), 16 U.S. C. (Supp. 1939), §§ 832 to 8321.
26 52 Stat. L. 403 (1938), 16 U.S. C. (Supp. 1939), §§ 833 to 833k.
27 52 Stat. L. 1215 (1938), 33 U.S. C. (Supp. 1939), § 701b. The Federal Power
Commission together with the chief of engineers recommends installation of hydroelectric facilities in dams erected for flood control.
28 52 Stat. L. 821 (1938), 15 U.S. C. (Supp. 1939), §§ 717 to 717w. See F1mERAL PowER COMMISSION, EIGHTEENTH ANNUAL REPORT 5 (1938). The act covers
interstate transportation of natural gas as to rates, pipe lines and similar matters and
facilities; it also covers importation and exportation of natural gas in foreign commerce.
29 49 Stat. L. 847 (1935), 16 U. S. C. (Supp. 1939), §§ 824 to 824h. The
"Public Utility Act of 1935" is divided into two titles. Title •I, the "Public Utility
Holding Company Act of 1935," 49 Stat. L. 803 (1935), 15 U. S. C.
(Supp. 1939), § 79 et seq., confers jurisdiction on the Securities and Exchange Commission. Title II, the "Federal Power Act of 1935," 49 Stat. L. 863 (1935), 16
U. S. C. (Supp. 1939), § 791a, et seq., amends and adds to the Federal Water Power
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of the Public Utility Act of 1935, which gives the Federal Power Commission authority to regulate interstate transmission and sale of electric
energy, thus establishing a parallel to the authority over natural gas
conferred by the Natural Gas Act of 1938. The present discussion will
be confined largely to these general acts that relate to hydroelectric
development and control of electric utilities.
a. Jurisdiction of the Federal Power Commission

The initial jurisdictional limits of the Federal Power Commission
under the Act of 1920 were largely determined by the definitions of
"navigable waters" so and "project," 31 both of which remain unchanged
in the Federal Power Act of 1935.82 A "project" designates an entire
water-power improvement unit, including power lines from the generators to a distribution or primary transmission system. The act defines navigable waters as follows:
"'Navigable waters' means those parts of streams or other
bodies of water over which Congress has jurisdiction under its
authority to regulate commerce with foreign nations and among
the several States, and which either in their natural or improved
condition, notwithstanding interruptions between the navigable
parts of such streams or waters by falls, shallows, or rapids compelling land carriage, are used or suitable for use for the transportation of persons or property in interstate or foreign commerce,
including therein all such interrupting falls, shallows, or rapids,
together with such other parts of streams as shall have been
authorized by Congress for improvement by the United States or
shall have been recommended to Congress for such improvement
after investigation under its authority." 88
Not content to rest the jurisdiction of the commission on this defiAct of 1920. For an outline of the commission'& present jurisdiction, see Scott "The
Federal Power Commission and Regulation of Public Utilities," 3 FED. B. A. J. 363,
( 193 9). The article gives an excellent insight into the attitude of one of the present
commissioners toward utility regulation. For a digest of the Public Utility Act of
1935, see WELCH, CASES ON PUBLIC UTILITY REGULATION, 2d ed., 765-770, 881885 (1936).
so 41 Stat. L. 1063 (1920), 16 U.S. C. (1934), § 796.
s1 Id.
82 49 Stat. L. 838 (1935), 16 U. S. C. (Supp. 1939), § 796. Of importance
here is an amendment of March 3, 1921, still in effect, 41 Stat. L. 1353 (1921),
16 U. S. C. (1934), § 797, requiring specific authority of Congress for a dam or
project in a national park.
88 41 Stat. L. 1063 (1920), 16 U.S. C. (1934), § 796, re-enacted by 49 Stat.
L. 838 (1935), 16 U.S. C. (Supp. 1939), § 796 (8).
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nition of "navigable waters," however, Congress inserted section 23b8'
in the Act of 1920. This section concerned project works on streams
other than "navigable waters" which were within the jurisdiction of
Congress under the commerce clause. Persons intending to construct
project works on such streams were permitted to file a declaration of
their intention with the commission if they so desired. If, upon investigation, the commission were to find that "the interests of interstate or
foreign commerce would be affected by such proposed construction,"
the declarant was not to proceed until he had applied for and received
"a license." Thus utilities secured the privilege of requesting an administrative determination of the status of a stream before starting to build
project works. But questions soon arose as to the breadth of the commission's jurisdiction under this section. The definition of "navigable
waters" in the act could conceivably be interpreted to cover all rivers
within the jurisdiction of Congress under the commerce clause. If this
interpretation were followed, what was contemplated by section 23b,
which on its face gave the commission jurisdiction to issue licenses for
projects on other than "navigable waters"? If the definition of "navigable waters" in the act were strictly construed to give the commission
only part of the jurisdiction of Congress, what was meant by the additional jurisdiction of the commission to issue licenses for projects on
streams other than "navigable waters" which would "affect interstate
commerce"? 85
The voluntary nature of the declaration of intention under section
23b was an additional source of difficulty. When the contemplated
project works were to be constructed on streams which were not "navigable waters," but which did "affect interstate commerce," the declarant, if it so chose, could pursue its own course in building a dam,
free from compulsory submission to the commission's control. In such
a situation, the commission was powerless to act itself and could only
urge the attorney general to bring an action to remove the dam under
the Act of 1890 and 1899. It is not surprising that during the twenties
the Federal Power Commission did not take full advantage of the broad
41 Stat. L. 1075 (1920), 16 U.S. C. (1934), § 817.
The trouble caused by § 23b is best illustrated by the history of the Appalachian Power case. See infra, p. 990 ff. In the district court decision in that case,
(D. C. Va. 1938) 23 F. Supp. 83 at 105, l II-II5, Judge Paul, after holding the
New River to be nonnavigable, expressed a fear as to the constitutionality of section
23 if it should be extended beyond the limits of control over nonnavigable streams
which Congress had actually exercised prior to 1920. Circuit Judge Parker, dissenting
from the decision in the circuit court of appeals, (C. C. A. 4th, 1939) 107 F. (2d)
769 at 798, presents the only judicial view in the recent Appalachian Power Company
litigation that section 23 is valid as to nonnavigable waters, even though the commission requires a major-part license.
34
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jurisdiction purportedly given to it. In their eagerness to make a comprehensive statute, the conservationists created ambiguities in the statutory jurisdiction of the commission and doubts as to the constitutionality
of that jurisdiction which effectively restricted the commission in its
practical operations. 86
The jurisdictional problems of the commission have been partially
solved by the Federal Power Act of 1935 and the Appalachian
Power Company case. The Act of 1935 gives the Federal Power Commission authority to investigate of its own accord "occupancy of, or
evidenced intention to occupy" for power purposes, streams over which
Congress has jurisdiction under the commerce clause, and to issue appropriate orders concerning water resources of the region involved. 87
Section 23b now makes directly unlawful, without aid of the Acts of
1890 and 1899, the erection of a dam or other works in the "navigable
waters" of the United States except under a license; it also makes the
filing of a declaration of intention mandatory even where a nonnavigable stream is involved. 88 In 1935 the authority of the commission
to issue a "minor part" license 89 where a nonnavigable stream affected
interstate commerce under the terms of section 23b was still not settled.
If the argument of the utilities were followed, "affecting interstate
commerce," when applied to waterways, would mean "affecting navigable capacity." Attorney General Mitchell evidently agreed with this
interpretation.40 It has been suggested, on the other hand, that since
the federal water development program is primarily in the interests
of the multiple purposes of conservation and since it aims at affirmatively improving navigation as well as negatively preventing adverse
effects on navigation, the sole test of the commission's jurisdiction over
86

Plum, "The Definition of Navigable Waters and the 'Doctrine of Minor Interest,'" 13 J. LAND & PuB. Unt. EcoN. 398 at 401-4oz (1937). That the Federal
Power Commission has not effectively exercised all its powers is indicated by the
fact that as late as 1940 no general statement in evaluating its work could be made.
ATTORNEY GENERAL's CoMMITrEE oN ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE, MONOGRAPH,
Part xz, "Federal Power Commission," 4-5 (1941) (Mimeographed Studies, No. z5,
p. 9) • In note 19, page 5, of the Monograph, there is set out a list of functions of the
commission which it has not exercised.
87
49 Stat. L. 839 (1935), 16 U.S. C. (Supp. 1939), § 797(g).
88
49 Stat. L. 846 (1935), 16 U.S. C. (Supp. 1939), § 817. The district court
and the circuit court of appeals in the Appalachian Power Company case refused to
give section z3 of the Act of 1935, a retroactive application.
89
41 Stat. L. 1068 (19zo), 16 U.S. C. (1934), § 803(i), as amended 49 Stat.
L. 84z (1935), 16 U.S. C. (Supp. 1939), § 803(i). A "minor part" license refers
to a partial or entire project of not more than JOO horsepower, installed capacity;
provision is made by the Federal Power Commission for waiver of most of the conditions included in "major" licenses. See 36 Op. Atty. Gen. 355 (1930).
0
"
36 Op. Atty. Gen. 355 (1930).
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streams should be the effect a stream. has on interstate or foreign commerce-a test purportedly synonymous with the test of Congress'
power over streams under the commerce clause.41 It would seem that
the Supreme Court has now in the Appalachian Power Company case
resolved most of these conflicts by making nearly every conceivable
stream "navigable"; federal courts will henceforth look to improvements that might be made on a stream in determining its navigability.42
As Justice Roberts pointed out in his dissent, the majority opinion
theoretically leaves an opening for a finding of nonnavigability in that
the cost and need of possible improvements are necessarily a matter
of degree; but practically the test will not leave an opening since determination of need and reasonable expenditures for improvements is
a legislative function. 43
Under Part II of the Federal Power Act of 1935, the Federal
Power Commission's jurisdiction is determined by the definition of a
"public utility." The term is used in the act to cover utilities engaged
in the interstate transmission and interstate sale at wholesale of electric
energy.44 This part was intended to co-ordinate electric power facilities
by interchange of energy and interconnection of facilities, and to fill
in loopholes resulting from the limitations on the regulatory powers
of the states.45 But because the commission's jurisdiction is set out in
broad terms, there is danger that the commission will clash with the
states if it regulates to the limits of its authority.
41 Plum, "The Definition of Navigable Waters and the 'Doctrine of Minor Interest,'" 13 J. LAND & PuB. UTIL. EcoN. 398 at 402-405 (1937).
42 United States v. Appalachian Electric Power Co., (U. S. 1940) 61 S. Ct.
291 at 299.
43 Id. at 3 u.
44 Definitions of the primary jurisdictional terms are found in the opening section
of Part II. 49 Stat. L. 847 (1935), 16 U. S. C. (Supp. 1939), § 824. For a discussion of these terms, see Plum, "A Critique of the Federal Power Act," 14 J. LAND &
PUB. UTIL. EcoN. 147 at 148 (1938). The opinion of the general counsel of the
commission as to what constitutes a "public utility'' under this part would make the
definition extremely broad. It would include a person who generates electricity which
is later disposed of in an interstate sale at wholesale, or who owns or operates facilities
which form part of a continuous interstate conduit, or who purchases interstate power
at wholesale. C. C. H., PUBLIC UTILITIES AND CARRIERS SERVICE, FEDERAL, 1f l 7070
(1936). A typical opinion of the commission applying the "public utility" test is In
re Application of Kansas Gas & Electric Co., (F. P. C. Op. 24, 1938) id., 1f 17164
(1938). In Matter of Twin States Gas & Electric Co., (F. P. C. Op. 44, 1940) id.,
1f I 7191 ( I 940), the commission was willing to exercise its powers, even though by
so doing the company would thereby lose its "public utility'' status.
45 Plum, "A Critique of the Federal Power Act,'' 14
EcoN. 147 (1938). See discussion infra p. 994.

J.
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b. Functions of the Federal Power Commission
The main functions delegated to the Federal Power Commission
relating to water power are set forth in section 4 of the Act of I 920.46
The Federal Power Commission is generally empowered: (I) to investigate and collect data on water resources, possible power sites and
their uses, and the "fair value" of power from government dams, ( 2)
to publish information collected and make reports to Congress,47 (3) to
investigate and make orders concerning the water power of streams over
which Congress has jurisdiction, and ( 4) to co-operate with other commissions and departments. In addition, section 4 delegated to the commission the primary function of licensing and issuing permits. The
commission is authorized to issue a license for the erection and maintenance of project works on streams which fall within Congress' commerce
power or which are upon public lands, and for using surplus water
power from government dams. The issuance of the license is conditioned upon the acceptance by the licensee of conditions set forth in the
act and further conditions prescribed by the Federal Power Commission, all to be expressly set forth in the license.48 The principal conditions expressed in the act relate to : (I) the duty of licensees to file
accounts and give the commission free access to their maps and similar
papers,49 ( 2) a limitation -of fifty years on all licenses,5° (3) the authority of the commission to modify project plans/1 (4) the duty of
licensees to secure the commission's approval to alterations in project
46
41 Stat. L. 1065 (1920), 16 U. S. C. (1934), §§ 797(a), 797(e), as
amended by 49 Stat. L. 839 (1935), 16 U. S. C. (Supp. 1939), §§ 797(a), 797(g).
47 Representative publications of the commission are: STATISTICS OF ELECTRIC
UTILITIES (1938); NATIONAL PowER SuRVEY REPORTS, Nos. 1 to 4 (1935); ELECTRIC RATE SuRVEY REPORTS, Nos. I to 8 (1935); THE UsE OF ELECTRIC PowER IN
TRANSPORTATION (1936); THE CoST OF DISTRIBUTION OF ELECTRICITY (1936). The
commission has issued numerous other publications relating to rates and accounts, :is
well as maps of electric utilities. The commission's NATIONAL ELECTRIC RATE BooK
is a comprehensive work, kept up to date by supplements, containing schedules of all
electric utilities serving communities with populations over one thousand.
48
41 Stat. L. 1067 (1920), 16 U.S. C. (1934), § 799, as amended by 49 Stat.
L. 841 (1935), 16 U.S. C. (Supp. 1939), § 799. The Federal Power Act of 1935
revises the provisions in this section concerning revocation, alteration, and surrender of
licenses.
49
41 Stat. L. 1065 (1920), 16 U. S. C. (1934), § 797(a), as amended by 49
Stat. L. 839 (1935), 16 U. S. C. (Supp. 1939), § 797(a). Cf. FEDERAL PowER
CoMMISSION, FOURTH ANNUAL REPORT 37 et seq. (1924).
50
41 Stat. L. 1067 (1920), 16 U. S. C. (1934), § 799, as amended by 49
Stat. L. 841 (1935), 16 U.S. C. (Supp. 1939), § 799. For the time limits as to starting a project, the elastic provisions for achieving completion, and the methods of
terminating a license, see 41 Stat. L. 1071 (1920), 16 U.S. C. (1934), § 806.
51
41 Stat. L. 1068 (1920), 16 U.S. C. (1934), § 803(a), as amended by 49
Stat. L. 842 (1935), 16 U.S. C. (Supp. 1939), § 803(a).
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works,52 ( 5) the duty of licensees to maintain and repair project works,
and to pay damages for injuries arising from erection and maintenance
of the works, 68 ( 6) the authority of the commission to apply excess
earnings to reduction of the "net investment," 54 ( 7) the duty of
licensees to pay reasonable annual charges to compensate the government for costs of administration and for the grant of privileges and
rights,5 5 ( 8) the duty of licensees to reimburse other licensees or the
government for direct benefits from their headwater improvements,5°
(9) the authority of the commission to recapture the project for the
government by authorizing payment to the licensee of the "net investment," which is not to exceed "fair value," 57 ( 1 o) the duty of licensees
to abide by state regulations as to rates and services. 58
Congress in 1935 was willing to venture further than its predecessors in omitting reference to navigation as a major consideration in
licensing. 59 The third condition above, relating to modification of
projects in the interests of a comprehensive scheme for waterway development, was altered in 1935 so as to omit "navigation" as one of
the objects of such a scheme, and to add "recreational" purposes. Noteworthy, also, was the change in the recapture clause, authorizing the
62

1935).
58

1935).

41 Stat. L. 1068 (1920), 16 U. S. C. (1934), § 803(b) (unchanged in
41 Stat. L. 1069 (1920), 16 U. S. C. (1934), § 803(c) (unchanged in

6 -i, 41 Stat. L. 1069 (1920), 16 U. S. C. (1934), § 803(d), as amended by
49 Stat. L. 842 (1935), 16 U.S. C. (Supp. 1939), § 803(d).
55 41 Stat. L. 1069 (1920), .16 U. S. C. (1934), § 803(e), as amended by
49 Stat. L. 842 (1935), 16 U.S. C. (Supp. 1939), § 803(e).
56 41 Stat. L. 1070 (1920), 16 U. S. C. (1934), § 803(f), as amended by
49 Stat. L. 842 (1935), 16 U.S. C. (Supp. 1939), § 803(f).
57 41 Stat. L. 1071 (1920), 16 U. S. C. (1934), § 807, as amended by 49
Stat. L. 844 (1935), 16 U. S. C. (Supp. 1939), § 807. As to the definition of "net
investment," Alabama Power Co. v. McNinch, (App. D. C. 1937) 94 F. (2d) 601,
discusses the statutory elements and the use of Interstate Commerce Commission
schedules and classifications. For a discussion of a valuation opinion of the commission,
see comments, 42 YALE L. J. 66, 248 (1932). That the Federal Power Commission
has authority to determine the "net investment'' at the time a license is issued, was
established in Clarion River Power Co. v. Hurley, (S. Ct. D. C. 1931) P. U. R.
1931B 263.
58 41 Stat. L. 1073 (1920), 16 U.S. C. (1934), § 812 (unchanged in 1935).
59 41 Stat. L. 1067 (1920), 16 U.S. C. (1934), § 8oo(a), as amended by 49 Stat.
L. 842 (1935), 16 U.S. C. (Supp. 1939), § 8oo(a). Preferences are now given states
and municipalit_ies in securing licenses if their plans are "equally well adapted . . .
to conserve and utilize in the public interest the water resources of the region."
Preferences may be given, as between other applicants, to those whose plans are best
adapted for like purposes. Reference to the "navigation" of the region is omitted. The
commission had suggested in its TWELFTH ANNUAL REPORT 7 (1932), that it be
given more definite authority to treat with recreational objects.

CoMMENTS

commission to set the recapture price instead of having the price set
by mutual agreement between the commission and the licensee or
by an action in equity. That a license was intended to carry with it some
vested rights is evidenced by section 28 of the Act of 1920, which
reserved to Congress the right to alter or repeal the act, but which
also provides that such action shall not a:ffect any license "theretofore
issued." 60 Section 20 61 of the act delegates broad regulatory functions
to the commission over interstate rates .and services, and over securities
of licensees and their subsidiaries, where the.states themselves cannot or
will not regulate.
Under Part II of the Act of 1935, the commission is given wide
regulatory authority over a "public utility": ( 1} to control its sales of
facilities, acquisition of securities in other public utilities, and mergers,62
(2) to control its security issues, 68 (3) to control rates, charges and services to prevent unreasonableness, discrimination and preferences,64 ( 4)
to investigate and ascertain the cost, depreciation, and the "fair value"
of its properties. 65 The rather unusual functions given the commission in
addition to those just enumerated provide for setting up regions for
"voluntary interconnection and co-ordination of facilities" in the interests of economy, conservation and general welfare, and ordering physical connections between utilities in the public interest.66 Since most in60 41 Stat. L. 1077 (1920), 16 U.S. C. (1934), § 822 (unchanged in 1935).
See Plum, "The Definition of Navigable Waters and the 'Doctrine of Minor Interest,'"
13 J. LAND & PUB. UTIL. EcoN. 398 (1937).
61
41 Stat. L. 1073 (1920), 16 U.S. C. (1934), § 813 (unchanged in 1935).
62
49 Stat. L. 849 (1935), 16 U.S. C. (Supp. 1939), § 824b. Opinions of the
commission dealing with merger standards: SIXTEENTH ANNUAL REPORT 14 et seq.
(1936); In re Application of Public Utility Service Electric & Gas Co., (F. P. C. Op.
33, 1938) C. C.H., PUBLIC UTILITIES AND CARRIERS SERVICE, FEDERAL, 1f 17,163
(1938). On the standard of transfers of facilities: F. P. A. Release 923, July 5, 1939,
id., 1f 17,175 (1939).
68
49 Stat. L. 850 (1935), 16 U. S. C. (Supp. 1939), § 824 c. Cf. Re Otter
Tail Power Co., F. P. A. Release 923, July 5, 1939, C. C. H., PUBLIC UTILITIES AND
CARRIERS SERVICE, FEDERAL, 1f 17,175 (1939), where the Federal Power Commission
interpreted "issuance of securities" to include rearrangement of outstanding shares, and
held the proposal submitted to be in the public interest because it created a wider
market for the stock.
64
49 Stat. L. 851-853 (1935), 16 U. S. C. (Supp. 1939), §§ 824d, 824e,
824f. An order applying an original cost base to rates is found in Matter of Interstate
Power Co. & Albany Lighting Co., (F. P. C. Op. 41, 1939), C. C. H., PUBLIC
UTILITIES AND CARRIERS SERVICE, FEDERAL, 1f 17,183 (1939). An order against discriminatory rates, fixing all at the level of the lowest: Matter of Otter Tail Power Co.,
(F. P. C. Op. 45, 1940) id., 1f 17,192 (1940).
65
49 Stat. L. 853 (1935), 16 U.S. C. (Supp. 1939), § 824g.
66
49 Stat. L. 848 (1935), 16 U.S. C. (Supp. 1939), § 824a. The commission has
divided the country into twelve regions and forty-five districts. Plum, "A Critique
of the Federal Power Act,'' 14 J. LAND & PuB. UTIL. EcoN. 147 at 153 (1938).
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terconnections are to be voluntary and the commission's authority to
force connections is circumscribed by the provision that it shall not
"unduly burden" a utility, these co-ordinating provisions may possibly
prove to represent the least important functions of the commission,
although they were intended to be of major importance.61
Part III 68 of the Federal Power Act of 1935 sets out the procedural
and administrative provisions for Parts I and IL These provisions are
directly connected with the licensing and regulatory functions of the
commission, and serve to implement them in an effective way. The
addition of specific requirements for "notice and opportunity for hearing'' in the amendments to the Federal Water Power Act in 1935 69
should serve to remind the commission that fairness to all persons is
an essential element of the administrative process. According to the
Attorney General's Committee on Administrative Procedure, the primary needs in the present procedure of the commission are: ( 1) some
method of limiting the issues in hearings on license applications, ( 2)
division of valuation hearings into preliminary and final phases, (3)
specification of findings with orders, ( 4) more frequent submission of
opinions with orders. 7°
One writer suggests that one of the greatest difficulties in the administration of the Federal Power Act is the problem of adjusting the
fields of regulation of the states and the federal government so that
their respective agencies will not clash.11 Specific provisions in the act
saving the powers and rights of the states to regulate are numerous, but
necessarily of a hit-and-miss character. An important provision relating
to state control is that found in Part II, providing for delegation by the
Federal Power Commission to joint state boards of its authority to
conduct hearings under this part, and authorizing the commission to
hold joint hearings with the state agencies. 12 A similar procedure can
be utilized by the Federal Power Commission under the Natural Gas
Act of 1938 78 and by the Interstate Commerce Commission in the
Id. 150-152.
49 Stat. L. 854 (1935), 16 U. S. C. (Supp. 1939), §§ 825-825r.
69 On cancellation of a permit, § 5; in readjusting charges for power sites on
reservations and tribal lands, § IO ( e) ; on setting the recapture price, § 14; in determining valuations of property of applicants who have prior vested rights, § 23 (a).
49 Stat. L. 841, 843, 844, 846 (1935), 16 U. S. C. (Supp. 1939), §§ 798, 803(e),
807, 816.
7°FINAL REPORT, ATTORNEY GENERAL'S COMMITTEE ON ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE 181-182 (1941).
71 Plum, "A Critique of the Federal Power Act," 14 J. LAND & Pun. DTIL.
EcoN. 147 at 154-161 (1938). See also, Ryan, "The Power Act of 1935," 18 Pun.
UTIL. FORTNIGHTLY 3 (1936).
72 49 Stat. L. 853 (1935), 16 U. S.C. (Supp. 1939), § 824h.
78 52 Stat. L. 830 (1938), 15 U.S. C. (Supp. 1939), § 717p.
67

68
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Motor Carrier Act of r935, 74 That the commission has thus far pursued a policy of stimulating state regulation and utilizing the cooperative procedures provided for in the act is a hopeful sign for future
harmony. 75
Relative to clashes between the Federal Power Commission and
other federal departments and boards, the possibilities for conflicts in
jurisdiction are manifold. In controlling flowing waters and water
power alone, the Secretaries of War, the Interior, Agriculture, and
Commerce, and the Tennessee Valley Authority, among others, have
a hand. 70 Probably the primary overlapping of authority is between
the Federal Power Commission and the Securities Exchange Commission in the Public Utility Act of r935. 77 The two commissions approach the problem from a slightly different point of view. The Power
Commission seeks geographical co-ordination of electric facilities to
prevent economic waste in production, transmission, and consumption
of electric energy. The Securities Commission is interested in integrating and simplifying financial structures and preventing geographical
"scatteration" of utility holding companies. The long-range effect of
the two programs will probably prove them to be consistent; but there
are numerous possibilities for conflict in immediate activities. To do its
part in satisfactorily resolving those conflicts which have resulted from
an indiscriminate conferring and delegating of authority by Congress,
u 49 Stat. L. 548 (1935), as amended by 52 Stat. L. 1237 (1938) 49 U. S. C.
(Supp. 1939), § 305(b). See Kauper, "Utilization of State Commissions in the Administration of the Federal Motor Carrier Act," 34 MicH. L. REV. 37 (1935).
76
FEDERAL PowER COMMISSION, THIRD ANNUAL REPORT 3 (1923); FIFTH
ANNUAL REPORT 4 (1925); Su:TH ANNUAL REPORT I (1926); FIFTEENTH ANNUAL
REPORT 3 (1935). See F. P. A. Release No. 123, Oct. 5, 1936, C. C. H., PuBLIC
UTILITIES AND CARRIERS SERVICE, FEDERAL, 1f 17,104 (1936), for procedures in
joint conferences and hearings. A plan was adopted, as reported in Su:TEENTH ANNUAL
REPORT 12 et seq. (1936), whereby state agencies and the commission are to keep
each other informed as to cases coming up in which the other may be interested.
711
Lineweaver, "Uncle Sam's Regulatory Topsy and the Power Industry," 19
PuB. UTIL. FORTNIGHTLY 293 (1937), points out 67 different federal agencies and
organizations that are more or less involved in the power industry; a little sensible
co-ordination is suggested, particularly in slashing the continual barrage of questionnaires
from Washington.
77
Plum, "A Critique of the Federal Power Act," 14 J. LAND & PUB. UTIL.
EcoN. 147 at 153-154 (1938). As to maps of the Federal Power Commission and
other agencies in setting up regions for co-ordination of electric utilities, Plum states,
"One wonders whether, when all these plans are superimposed, one upon another, the
rationalized power map will not look more like a railroad mortgage map. Apparently
the regulatory mechanism will need to be coordinated fully as much as the power
industry." Specific provision is made in the Federal Power Act for superior jurisdiction
in the Securities and Exchange Commission in matters where its functions and those
of the Federal Power Commission overlap. 49 Stat. L. 863 (1935), 16 U. S. C.
(Supp. 1939), § 8254.
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by the judicious application of the statutes and by interdepartmental
co-operation, should be one of the major tasks of the Federal Power
Commission.

3. Constitutional Aspects of the Federal Power Program
a. The Appalachian Power Company Case
The Appalachian Power Company case 78 suggests a reconsideration
of the constitutional questions involved in the federal power program.
In this case the Appalachian Power Company, at the suggestion of the
commission, filed an application in 1926 for a license to build a dam
in the New River at Radford, Virginia. The following year after a
public hearing the commission found the New River to be nonnavigable,
but also found that the proposed project would "affect interstate commerce." Thereupon the commission tendered to the company a standard
form license, which was refused on the grounds that the conditions
were not at all related to navigation. In 1930, while reiterating that the
project was not within the jurisdiction of the commission, the company
offered to accept a "minor-part" license. After another hearing ( this
time by the newly created independent agency), the commission in
1932 adopted a resolution that the New River was navigable. Despite
the lack of a federal license, but fortified by its own riparian ownership
and the approval of the state of Virginia, the company commenced
construction in 1934. One year later the United States filed a bill to
enjoin any further construction otherwise than under a license from
the Federal Power Commission. The district court 79 held ( 1) that the
New River was not a navigable water of the United States; (2) that
the project would not affect any navigable water of the United States;
(3) that the Federal Water Power Act did not vest in the commission
authority to require a license in a nonnavigable river; ( 4) that even
if the commission had authority to require some license for a dam in
nonnavigable waters, it could not impose conditions having no relation
to the protection of the navigable capacity of "waters of the United
States." The circuit court of appeals a:ffirmed. 80 The Supreme Court,
with Justice Reed writing the opinion for the majority, reversed the
decisions of the two lower courts, in a decision holding that the New
River was a navigable water of the United States and that the license
· conditions were a proper regulation of water-power development-"a
by-product of the general use of the rivers for commerce."
The case marks the most important judicial step in the rapidly
78 United States v. Appalachian Electric Power Co., (U.S. 1940) 61 S. Ct. 291.
See 54 HARV. L. REv. 876 (1941); and 89 UNiv. PA. L. REv. 672 (1941).
79
(D. C. Va. 1938) 23 F. Supp. 83.
80
(C. C. A. 4th, 1939) 107 F. (2d) 769.
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expanding federal power program since the case of Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley Authority. 81 TheAshwandef' case established the federal
government's authority to enter the field of manufacturing and selling
electric power-the "yardstick" method of regulation. The Appalachian
case now establishes the federal government's authority to impose direct
control and regulation of privately owned hydroelectric utilities. It is
this latter type of regulation and its constitutional problems, in light of
the Appalachian case, which are here considered. The subject will be
discussed from two aspects: (I) the sources of Congressional authority
over electric utilities; and ( 2) the possible limitations on the exercise
of that authority.

b. Sources of Congressional Authority
Two elements of the plenary authority granted to Congress under
the commerce clause 82 are utilized by that body in the regulation of
private electric utilities. One of those is the power over navigable
waters; the other, the power over interstate movement of articles of
commerce-interstate transmission of electric energy in this case.
It has long been established that federal control over commerce
extends to control over navigation between the states. 88 This principle
was clearly stated in Gilman v. Philadelphia: 84
"Commerce includes navigation. The power to regulate commerce comprehends the control for that purpose, and to the extent
necessary, of all the navigable waters of the United States which
are accessible from a State other than those in which they lie."
Obviously not all bodies of water in the United States are "navigable
waters of the United States." Therefore, the problem of determining
just what waters fall within the definition becomes a significant constitutional issue. The English courts resolved the question by simply
stating that all waters affected by the tide were navigable waters. And
for a time that doctrine was followed in this country. 84a But the test was
soon found to be inapplicable here, due to the difference in topography,
and was therefore discarded by the Supreme Court. 85 The case of The
81

297 U.S. 288, 56 S. Ct. 466 (1936).
U. S. Constitution, Art. I, § 8.
82
U. S. Constitution, Art. I, § 8.
Philadelphia, 3 Wall. (70 U.S.) 713 at 724 (1865); Gloucester Ferry Co. v. Pennsylvania, II4 U. S. 196 at 302, 5 S. Ct. 826 (1885).
84
3 Wall. (70 U. S.) 713 at 724-725 (1865).
s4a Starr, "Navigable Waters of the United States," 35 HARV. L. REv. 154
(1921).
85
The Genesee Chief v. Fitzhugh, 12 How. (53 U.S.) 443 at 457 (1852).
However, soine state courts continued to follow the English doctrine. As the question
82
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Daniel Ball 86 laid down the test which is most frequently quoted in
Supreme Court decisions on navigability. 87 There the Court said:
"Those rivers must be regarded as public navigable rivers in law
which are navigable irr fact. And they are navigable in fact when
they are used, or are susceptible of being used, in their ordinary
condition, as highways for commerce, over which trade and travel
are or may be conducted in the customary modes of trade and
travel on water." 88
However, the Court in the Appalachian Power case, though referring89 to the Daniel Ball case, comes forth with what seems to be a
completely new rule-the reasonable improvability test. The adoption
of this new doctrine indicates that Congress has plenary power over
any waterway which "reasonable improvements" would make suitable
for use in interstate commerce. The Court specifically states:
"In determining the navigable character qf the New River it is
proper to consider the feasibility of interstate use after reasonable
improvements which might be made." 90
And again:
"A waterway, otherwise suitable for navigation, is not barred from
that classification merely because artificial aids must make the
of what is a "navigable water of the United States" would seem to depend finally in
each case upon the adjudication of the United States Supreme Court, only the decisions
of that Court are considered in the instant discussion. For a consideration of some
of the state court decisions on navigability along with the Des Plaines River Cases, see
Starr, "Navigable Waters of the United States," 35 HARV. L. REv. 154 (1921).
86 IO Wall. (77 U.S.) 557 (1871).
87 Leovy v. United States, 177 U. S. 621, 20 S. Ct. 797 (1900); Escanaba &
L. M. Transportation Co. v. Chicago, 107 U. S. 678, 2 S. Ct. 185 (1882); United
States v. Rio Grande Dam & Irrigation Co., 174 U. S. 690, 19 S. Ct. 770 (1899);
Brewer-Elliott Oil & Gas Co. v. United States, 260 U. S. 77, 43 S. Ct. 60 (1922);
United States v. Holt State Bank, 270 U. S. 49, 46 S. Ct. 197 (1926); United
States v. Utah, 283 U. S. 64, 51 S. Ct. 438 (1931); United States v. Oregon, 295
U.S. 1, 55 S. Ct. 610 (1935).
88 10 Wall. (77 U.S.) 557 at 563 (1871).
89 ln 61 S. Ct. 291 at 298-299, Justice Reed cites The Daniel Ball case, but
adds, "Each application of this test, however, is apt to uncover variations and refinements which require further elaboration."
90 61 S. Ct. 291 at 300. As authority for the statement, the Court cites Barnes
v. United States, 46 Ct. Cl. 7 (1910). An examination of the citation reveals that the
Barnes case relies in turn upon the case of The Montello, 20 Wall. (87 U. S.) 430
(1874). It is interesting to see that in the Montello case (1) the improvements had
been made prior to the decision that the water was navigable, and ( 2) one of the main
bases for the conclusion of the Court was that the river had actually ~een used for
commerce even before any improvements had been made.
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highway suitable for use before commercial navigation may be
undertaken. . . . The power of Congress over commerce is not to
be hampered because of the necessity for reasonable improvements
to make an interstate waterway available for traffic." 91
This decision seems to introduce a much broader conception of what
constitutes "navigable waters" than previously existed. Though the
doctrine of improvability has been referred to as being new, that description is not entirely accurate. The idea seems to have first appeared
in Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley Authority. In determining whether
the Wilson dam was erected under constitutional authority, the Court
said:
"While, in its present condition, the Tennessee River is not
adequately improved for commercial navigation, and traffic is
small, we are not at liberty to conclude either that the river is not
susceptible of development as an important waterway, or that
Congress has not undertaken that development, or that the construction of the Wilson Dam was not an appropriate means to
accomplish a legitimate end." 92
The Court concluded that the erection of Wilson Dam was constitutional. However, the decision is a weak precedent for the reasonable
improvability rule, since the Wilson Dam could have been constructed
under federal jurisdiction in a nonnavigable stream inasmuch as it was
originally authorized by Congress in 1918 in exercise of its war power.98
The main basis for the broad interpretation the Court gave to the
rule seems to be the definition of "navigable waters" contained in the
Federal Water Power Act. 94 Certainly the Court was not led to believe
that the improvability rule removed any of the uncertainties arising from
the former definitions of "navigable waters," which were based on the
91

61 S. Ct. 291 at 299.
Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley Authority, 297 U. S. 288 at 329, 56 S. Ct.
466 (1936).
93
President Wilson actually authorized the construction, but he derived his
authority from the National Defense Act of 1916, which was passed under the war
power of Congress, Art. I, § 8 of the Federal Constitution.
Also, it seems that the Court in the Ashwander case regarded the Wilson Dam
as a possible improvement of navigation facilities. There would seem to be a significant
distinction between the direct attempt of Congress to make a nonnavigable stream
navigable, and the attempt by Congress to regulate an obstruction placed in a nonnavigable water. In the first instance Congress is actually trying to improve interstate
commerce facilities. In the case of the regulation this is not necessarily true. Therefore,
quaere as to whether it was necessary to establish that the Tennessee River was navigable in the Ashwander case?
94
49 Stat. L. 838 (1935), 16 U.S. C. (Supp. 1939), § 796(8), quoted at note
33, supra.
92
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use of the stream in its "natural" and "ordinary" condition.95 The older
tests involved difficult factual determinations, but the reasonable improvability test only adds to those difficulties elements of hypothesis
and conjecture. It is noteworthy that the Court went out of its way
_to enunciate this new test when it is possiblei that the case could have
been disposed of by relying on the doctrine of Economy Light &
Power Co. v. United States.96 There it was held that a stream once
actually used for navigation remained navigable until Congress abandoned jurisdiction over it. 97 However anomalous the "reasonable improvability" test may seem, it is clear that the doctrine will serve as
a foundation for still further expansion of federal control over the
waterways of the United States.
The Federal Power Act of 1935 gave the commission authority
to regulate the interstate transmission of electrical energy. That the
interstate transmission of gas falls within the judicial conception of
interstate commerce has been established for some time. 98 The case of
Public Utilities Commission v. Attleboro Steam & Electric Co.99
clearly brought the interstate transmission of electric current within
the same doctrine. The provisions of the 1935 statute conferring jurisdiction on the commission over interstate transmission of electric power
are of particular interest since they dearly demonstrate that the drafters
of the act were closely following the Supreme Court decisions involving
state control over interstate transmission of gas. 100 In Pennsylvania Gas
Co. v. Public Service Commission 101 the company transmitted natural
gas by a pipeline from the source of supply in Pennsylvania to a point of
distribution in New York. There it subdivided the gas and sold it at'
retail to local consumers. Under those facts the United States Supreme
Court held that the State Public Service Commission of New York
had jurisdiction to regulate the rates charged local consumers, because
the service rendered was essentially local and in such' a case the state
had a "permissible authority" to act until Congress occupied the field.
Missouri ex rel. Barrett v. Kansas Natural Gas Co.102 presented the
95 The Court says, "This is no more indefinite than a rule of navigability in fact
as adopted below based upon 'useful interstate commerce' or 'general and common
usefulness for purposes of trade and commerce.••.'" 61 S. Ct. 291 at 299.
96 256 u. s. II3, 41 s. Ct. 409 (19,21).
97 Id., 256 U. S. II3 at 124. There is some evidence that the New River was
used for navigation purposes at one time.
.
98 Public Utilities Commission v. Landon, 249 U.S. 236, 39 S. Ct. 268 (1919);
Oklahoma v. Kansas Natural Gas Co., 221 U.S. 229, 31 S. Ct. 564 (19II); Haskell
v. Kansas Natural Gas Co., 224 U.S. 217, 32 S. Ct. 442 (1912).
99 273 U.S. 83, 47 S. Ct. 294 (1927).
100 49 Stat. L. 847 (1935), 16 U. S. C. (Supp. 1939), § 824.
101 252 U.S. 23, 40 S. Ct. 279 (1920).
102 265 U.S. 298, 44 S. Ct. 544 (1924).
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case of a company which transported natural gas by continuous pipe
lines from wells in Oklahoma and Kansas into, Missouri. There it sold
and delivered the gas to distributing companies, which in turn sold and
delivered to local consumers. In that situation the Court held Missouri
had no jurisdiction to regulate the rates charged the distributing companies, because the enforcement of a selling price in such a transaction
would be a direct burden upon interstate commerce. The Court said:
"It is as though the Commission stood at the state line and imposed its regulation upon the final step in the process at the
moment the interstate commodity entered the State and before
it had become part of the general mass of property therein." 103
Since the Attleboro case 104 applied the same principles to electricity, the
authority of the states to regulate the sale to local consumers even
though the product had previously crossed the state boundary line was
well fixed. But equally clear was the lack of state authority to regulate
a sale at wholesale to a distributor where the product had crossed a state
line. The Act of 1935 left the regulation by the states undisturbed,
but it asserted federal control to the extent necessary to bridge the gap
occasioned by the deficiencies of state power. In this respect the act
demonstrates a commendable exercise of self-restraint on the part of
Congress.
It is true ordinarily that the commerce clause serves as the principal source of authority for the imposition of federal regulation of
electrid power companies, but it is not the sole source. Today the war
power of Congress 105 is becoming increasingly important. The significance of this power is indicated in the case of Ashwander v. Tennessee
Valley Authority.106 Another source of federal authority over water power
development is the provision of the Federal Constitution which gives
Congress control over public lands. 101 This is particularly important
in the West where the proportion of land owned by the United States
is surprisingly high. 108 Since it has been held by the Court that the
103

Id., 265 U. S. 298 at 308.

10"

Public Utilities Commission v. Attleboro Steam & Electric Co., 273 U. S.

83, 47 S. Ct. 294 (1927).

S. Constitution, Art. I, § 8.
297 U. S. 288, 56 S. Ct. 466 (1936).
107 U. S. Constitution, Art. IV, § 3.
105 U.

106

108 Some conception of the extent of the public domain in the West may be gained
from the following figures, taken from KERWIN, FEDERAL WATER-PowER LEGISLA-

TION

65 (1926).
The United States owns:
92 % of the lands within the state of Arizona
52 % of the lands within the state of California
56% of the lands within the state of Colorado
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United States has the rights of an ordinary proprietor in respect to its
own land,109 it can fix the terms on which its property may be used.110
The remaining possible constitutional foundation for federal power
control is the treaty-making power of the President.m This is not as
important as the other bases because its application probably is limited
to power projects in national boundary streams.112

c. Limitations on the Exercise of Constitutional Authority
It is evident that there is ample co~stitutional authority for the
federal power regulation program. There remains to be considered
what, if any, limitations exist on the exercise of that authority.
In pursuing this inquiry, two questions will be treated: First, is
the power of Congress over navigable waters restricted solely
objects which are directly concerned with the protection of navigation?
Second, what are the due process limitations?
One of the major questions the Court faced in the Appalachian
Power case was whether Congress, by virtue of its power over navigable waters, had authority to insert conditions in Federal Power Commission licenses which had no connection with navigation, but rather
imposed stringent regulations on the economic and financial policies of
the licensee.118 The answer of the Court left no doubt that the power
of Congress over navigable streams is not confined to purposes connected with navigation. The Court's argument is double-barreled.
In the first place, it seems to say, navigability is only a part of com-

to

83 % of the lands within the state of Idaho
6 5 % of the lands within the state of Montana
88 % of the lands within the state of Nevada
63 % of the lands within the state of New Mexico
5 1 % of the lands within the state of Oregon
80% of the lands within the state of Utah
40% of the lands within the state of Washington
68 % of the lands within the state of Wyoming
109 Camfield v. United States, 167 U.S. 518, 17 S. Ct. 864 (1896).
110 Light v. United States, 220 U.S. 523, 536, 31 S. Ct. 485 (1911).
111 U. S. Constitution, Art. II, § 2.
112 As indicated, the practical application of this power in restricted to national
boundary streams, but there is a theoretical possibility of the use of this power being
extended. Art. VI provides that the Constitution and the laws of the United States
"and all treaties made, or which shall be made, under the Authority of the United
States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land." Under that clause it is possible that a
treaty with Canada providing for the sale of electric energy to Canada, and containing
provisions for the regulation of the production of that energy, would be as controlling
as the Federal Power Act.
113 Justice Reed, speaking of the license conditions, said: "It is quite true that
the criticized provisions summarized above are not essential to or even concerned with
navigation as such." 61 S. Ct. 291 at 307.
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merce, and water-power development from dams in navigable streams
is really a by-product of the general use of the rivers for commerce.
Hence the license conditions have "an obvious relationship to the exercise of the commerce power." Secondly, the power of Congress over
navigable waters is so complete that it could deny the privilege of constructing an obstruction altogether. Therefore, it can grant the privilege on such terms as it may desire.
In respect to the first argument, the Court's statement that the
regulation of the accounting system of a hydroelectric power company
located in a navigable stream has "an obvious relationship to the exercise of the commerce power'' 114 seems to state a conclusion without a
reason. A question admitting of an obvious answer would hardly have
been the subject of such strenuous litigation. The Court's conclusion
is based upon the premise that a water-power development in a navigable stream is commerce because the public looks upon such development as "a by-product of the general use of the rivers for commerce." 115
Stripped of its legal niceties, the decision seems to say that once Congressional control over a waterway is established by a declaration of the
stream's navigability, the federal control will not be limited to objects which are solely for the protection of navigation. Though there
is considerable dictum on the other side which supports Justice Brandeis'
statement that "The right of the United States in the navigable waters
within the several States is limited to the control thereof for purposes
of navigation," 116 two cases afford the Appalachian Power decision
strong precedent. One, United States v. Chandler-Dunbar Water
Power Co.,111 held that when the federal government had constructed
a dam and locks for the purpose of improving navigation, it could lease
the surplus water power thereby created. The other, Ashwander v.
Tennessee Valley Authority,118 held that where the federal government
had erected a dam in navigable waters it could not only lease the surplus water power but could go into the business of producing and
selling hydroelectric current.119 If the United States government itself
114

61 S. Ct. 291 at 308.
Id., 61 S. Ct. 291 at 308.
116
Port of Seattle v. Oregon & W. R. R., 255 U. S. 56 at 63, 41 S. Ct. 237
(1921). See also United States v. Oregon, 295 U. S, I at 14, 55 S. Ct. 610 (1935);
Kansas v. Colorado, 206 U. S. 46, 27 S. Ct. 655 (1907); United States v. River
Rouge Imp. Co., 269 U. S. 411, 46 S. Ct. 144 (1926); Wisconsin v. Illinois, 278
U.S. 367, 49 S. Ct. 163 (1929).
117
229 U.S. 53, 33 S. Ct. 667 (1913).
118
297 U.S. 288, 56 S. Ct. 466 (1936).
119 The Ashwander case is somewhat weaker precedent because, as has been pointed
out, the federal power in that instance was not derived solely from power over navigable waters but also from the war power.
115
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can go into the water-power business on the basis of its power over
navigable streams, it seems logical that it can regulate licensee companies who erect obstructions in those streams.120
That the states held a material interest in the decision on the constitutionality of the Federal Power Act is evidenced by the fact that
forty-one states 121 joined in submitting an amicus curiae brief in support of the company's argument in the Appalachian Power case. The primary concern of the states seems to be their fear that at the expiration of
the license period the federal government will take over the power plants
located in navigable streams, and thus the states will be deprived of a
lucrative source of revenue. This is, of course, only one aspect; the
expanding control of Congress over hydroelectric power may mean the
end of a large amount of state authority, though this is not necessarily
true. 122 The states argued that by virtue of the Tenth Amendment128
control over water-power development within their jurisdiction is guaranteed to them. 124 Justice Reed's answer to this contention can hardly be
controverted: the commerce clause delegates to Congress the power to
exercise the authority attempted over water-power development; hence
it is not a power which is reserved to the states.
The recent trend of the Supreme Court opinions, with emphasis on
government authority rather than upon individual rights, indicates that
the due process clause in its substantive aspects is being rapidly devitalized. Nevertheless, a discussion of possible due process limitations on
the federal power regulation program seems pertinent. In the consideration of due process three provisions are more significant than the
others. These provisions relate to: (1) control over rates,125 (2) expropriation of excessive profits,120 (3) recapture of the licensee's propSee 32 M1cH. L. REv. IOI (1933).
The Court in its opinion makes the statement that forty-one states joined in
the amici brief, but according to the office of the Federal Power Commission counsel
there were thirty-nine states which joined as amici curiae in the North Carolina brief,
West Virginia, Virginia, and Wisconsin filing separate briefs.
122 Under some of the provisions of the program if the state takes action the
Federal Power Commission has no jurisdiction. In these situations if the state wants
to preserve its power it can do so by enacting some regulations of its own. Other provisions provide for cooperation between the states and the commission.
128 The Tenth Amendment provides: "The powers not delegated to the United
States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the
States respectively, or to the people."
124 For a discussion of this argument, see Shields, "The Federal Power Act," 73
UNIV. PA. L. REV. 142 at 151-152 (1925).
125 41 Stat. L. 1073 (1920), 16 U.S. C. (1934), § 813 as amended by 49 Stat.
L. 852 (1935), 16 U.S. C. (Supp. 1939), § 824e.
126 41 Stat. L. 1069 (1920), 16 U. S. C. (1934), § 803(e), as amended by 49
Stat. L. 843 (1935), 16 U.S. C. (Supp. 1939), § 803(e).
120

121
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erty by payment of the net investment.121 For purposes of analysis two
separate avenues of approach are convenient. First the provisions will
be examined as if theywereindependentstatutoryrestrictions. Secondly,
they will be examined in their legislative context as conditions annexed
to a federal grant of privilege.
Both the Act of 1920 and the Act of 1935 contain clauses giving
the commission power to control rates of power companies. It cannot
be disputed that power companies are sufficiently affected with a public
interest to warrant rate regulation. Moreover, rates and prices even
in the nonutility field have lost their immunity to governmental regulation.128 There is, however, possible ground for attacking the basis
upon which the commission is to calculate the "reasonable return" to
power companies. The Act of I 920 provides that the rate of return shall
be based upon actual and legitimate investment. This provision for establishing original cost as the rate base seems to be contrary to the doctrine
of "fair value" enunciated in Smyth v. Ames.129 But it is doubtful
whether this unsatisfactory concept 130 has enough present vitality to
be an obstacle to the exercise of the commission's rate-fixing power.
Apparently the expropriation of excessive profits was a matter
deemed imperative by Congress in l 920, since the Transportation
Act 181 of that year contained a provision for the recapture of excessive
railroad earnings.182 Those provisions were scrutinized by the Supreme
Court in 1924. Chief Justice Taft, speaking for the majority which upheld the validity of the statute, said: "The reduction of the net operating return provided by the recapture clause is, as near as may be, the
same thing as if rates had all been reduced proportionately before collection." 188 The similarity of this provision to the one in the Federal
Water Power Act, together with the tendency of the Court to minimize
the significance of the due process clause, leads to the conclusion that
127
41 Stat. L. 1071 (1920), 16 U.S. C. (1934), § 807, as amended by 49 Stat.
L. 844 (1935), 16 U.S. C. (Supp. 1939), § 807.
128 Nebbia v. New York, 291 U. S. 502, 54 S. Ct. 505 (1934). See also United
States v. Rock Royal Cooperative, 307 U. S. 533, 59 S. Ct. 993 (1939); and Sunshine Anthracite Coal Co. v. Adkins, 310 U.S. 381, 60 S. Ct. 907 (1940); 39 MrcH.
L. REV. 621 (1941).
129 169 U. S. 466, 18 S. Ct. 418 (1898).
180 See Kauper, "Wanted: A New Definition of the Rate Base," 37 MrcH. L.
REV. 1209 (1939).
181 41 Stat. L. 456 -(1920), 49 U.S. C. (1934), § 71 et seq.
182 41 Stat. L. 464 (1920), 49 U.S. C. (1934), § 77.
188 Dayton-Goose Creek Ry. v. United States, 263 U. S. 456 at 483, 44 S. Ct.
169 (1924). The term "recapture" when used in connection with the Transportation
Act means expropriation of excessive profits. The term "recapture" when used in connection with the Federal Water Power Act means the purchase by the government of
the entire property at the expiration of the license period.
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the expropriation of excessive profits does not run afoul of any due
process limitations.184
The provision for the recapture of the property of the licensee
upon the expiration of the license created considerable alarm at one
time.185 The obvious effect of allowing the government to take over
the property upon the payment of the "net investment" was to permit
the government to obtain the property without compensating for any
increment in value which might perhaps accrue to the company during
the fifty-year license period. It is elementary that under the Fifth
Amendment the federal government must pay the "present fair value"
of property which is expropriated for public use.186 Standing by itself, a
statute authorizing payment of original cost instead of present value in
condemnation proceedings would be clearly unconstitutional.
Conceding that regulation of rates on the basis of original prudent
investment is of doubtful validity and that expropriation of private
property at less than fair value is clearly unconstitutional, are the
constitutional difficulties surmounted when these legislative requirements are attached by way of condition to a grant of federal privilege?
To this question the Appalachian Power Company case gives an affirmative answer. Relying upon the Fox River Company case,187 the Court
says that even assuming the statute allowed the government to take
over the licensee's property for less than its value, it would not be unconstitutional. The Fox River Company case held that because Wisconsin could wholly forbid the erection of an obstruction in the navigable
waters of the state, the state could grant permission for the erection
upon any terms it saw fit. However, a consideration of the Fox River
Company case compels one to look at the decision of Frost & Frost
Trucking Co. v. Railroad Commission,188 one of the leading cases
embodying the doctrine of "unconstitutional conditions." Holding that
the state of California could not condition its grant of a certificate of
public convenience and necessity upon the agreement of a private carrier
to become a common carrier, the Court said:
"as a general rule, the state, having power to deny a privilege altogether, may grant it upon such conditions as it sees fit to impose.
But the power of the state in that respect is not unlimited; and one
184

This point is not given any separate consideration in the Appalachian case.
See Le Boeuf, "State or Federal Control of the Water Powers of Navigable
Streams," 15 GEORGETOWN L. J. 201 at 229 (1927).
186
Monongahela Navigation Co. v. United States, 148 U.S. 312, 13 S. Ct. 622 .
(1893).
187
Fox River Paper Co. v. Railroad Commission, 274 U. S. 651, 47 S. Ct. 669
(1927).
188
271 U.S. 583, 46 S. Ct. 605 (1926).
185
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of the limitations is that it may not impose conditions which require the relinquishment of constitutional rights." 139
The cases on this subject are in conflict.140 There are many cases involving the application of the doctrine to grants of state privileges, but it
has never been clear that the doctrine was deemed applicable to the
exercise of federal power. 141 The Court in the Appalachian Power case
seems completely to ignore the doctrine and accepts the theory that if
a privilege can be denied by the federal government, it can be granted
subject to any conditions that Congress sees fit. It seems proper to
conclude that in the interpretation of the due process clause of the Fifth
Amendment the theory of unconstitutional conditions is in no way
relevant.
While the major constitutional doubts as to the federal power program have been removed, there still exist many problems to be solved.
There is the problem of a closer integration and synchronization of
the "yardstick" method of regulation and the direct type of control
exercised by the Federal Power Commission. Both have the common
goal of improving the service and reducing the cost of electricity to
the citizens of the United States. At present the two types are too
completely independent to obtain the most satisfactory results. Expanding the authority of the Federal Power Commission over the disposition of government electric power would substitute harmony for
the discords of the present segregation of control. Not only should
Congress resolve the interdepartmental conflicts concerning government
Id., 271 U. S. at 593-594.
There are many cases supporting the Frost case: Insurance Co. v. Morse, 20
Wall. (87 U. S.) 445 at 456 (1874); Barron v. Burnside, 121 U. S. 186 at 200,
7 S. Ct. 931 (1887); Lafayette Ins. Co. v. French, 18 How. (59 U.S.) 404 at 407
(1855); St. Clair v. Cox, 106 U. S. 350 at 356, I S. Ct. 354 (1882); Southern
Pacific Co. v. Denton, 146 U.S. 202 at 207, 13 S. Ct. 44 (1892); Terral v. Burke
Construction Co., 257 U.S. 529 at 532, 42 S. Ct. 188 (1922); Western Union Tel.
Co. v. Kansas, 216 U. S. 1 at 34-38, 30 S. Ct. 190 (1910); Pullman Co. v. Kansas,
216 U.S. 56 at 63, 30 S. Ct. 232 (1910); Herndon v. Chicago, R. I. & P. Ry., 218
U.S. 135 at 158, 30 S. Ct. 633 (1910); Harrison v. St. Louis & S, F. Ry., 232 U.S.
318 at 332, 34 S. Ct.333(1914); Looney v. Crane Co., 245 U.S. 178 at 187, 38
S. Ct. 85 (1917); Fidelity & Deposit Co. v. Tafoya, 270 U. S. 426, 46 S. Ct. 331
(1926); Western Union Tel. Co. v. Foster, 247 U.S. 105 at 114, 38 S. Ct. 438
(1918); Public Utility Commrs. v. Ynchausti & Co., 251 U.S. 401 at 404, 40 S. Ct.
277 (1920); Missouri ex rel. Burns National Bank v. Duncan, 265 U. S. 17 at 24,
44 S. Ct. 427 (1924). Bu see also ELSBREE, INTERSTATE TRANSMISSION OF ELECTRIC
POWER, c. 2 (1931).
Hl The only intimations that the doctrine limits federal power appear in the
first Employers' Liability Cases, 207 U. S. 463 at 502-503, 28 S. Ct. 141 (1907), and
in United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. I at 71, 56 S. Ct. 312 (1936), where the Frost
case is cited and language therefrom quoted.
139
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power projects, but also it should attempt to coordinate the functions
of regulatory agencies dealing with securities, accounts, regional planning and similar matters.
Another difficulty confronting the federal power control program
is that there are still many problems which are more sectional than
national. In other words, there is still considerable room for local control. The 1935 act recognizes this fact; its provision for joint hearings
by state agencies and the Federal Power Commission, and its authorization of joint boards composed of representatives from different states, is
an intelligent treatment of the situation. In meeting a question which
involves local policy, the commission should be encouraged to avail
itself of these procedures.
Robert P. Kneeland
Stark Ritchie

